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THE PROBLEMATIC STRUCTURE OF THE
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
George L. Priest*

INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses the structure and organization of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001. The Article is inspired by the extraordinary controversy that has attended the Fund
and its operation. There is-in my view-a universal consensus that it
was entirely appropriate for the Congress, on behalf of the American
people, to create the Fund. All citizens sympathize with the
thousands of victims of the September 11th attacks, and I have seen
no serious commentary suggesting that a compensation program like
the September 11th Fund should not have been created. Moreover,
there is also general consensus that the person to whom widespread
discretion for its implementation has been delegated, Special Master
Kenneth Feinberg, has executed his duties, as much as he possibly can,
with good judgment, commitment, and dedication to the victims
whom the Fund aspires to compensate.
Nevertheless, the September 11th Fund has generated remarkable
controversy. Virtually all of its individual components have been criticized in some form.1 Although the very large majority (97%) of those
eligible for compensation filed claims, 2 the Special Master has been
sued by sets of families in federal court, chiefly, it appears, by families
of comparatively high income victims (many from Cantor Fitzgerald).
For months, the press reported heated complaints about the Fund on
nearly a weekly basis.
* John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Francis
McGovern for discussions on this topic, to participants at a Faculty Workshop at the University
of Colorado Law School for comments on an earlier draft, and to Patricia Florio and Elizabeth
Berkowitz for research assistance.
1. For examples of the criticism, see the discussion of comments on the Fund in September
11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274 (Dec. 21,
2001), Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002). See also infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
2. David W. Chen, Man Behind Sept. 11 Fund Describes Effort As a Success, with Reservations, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 1, 2004 at BI.
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Perhaps the controversy should not be surprising, given that Con3
gress "deliberated" for only three days over the Fund's enactment.
But I believe that the controversy stems from other sources and will
become more heated as the details of the Fund's operation are subsequently revealed. The September 11th Fund fits not easily within the
parameters of the four principal institutions that we possess in this
society for dealing with the consequences of unintended loss: tort law;
private market insurance; government insurance; and government
welfare. Tort law is designed to deal with harms inflicted by some
identifiable person who was in a position to have prevented the harm.
Tort law shifts the costs of injuries to such persons in order to create
incentives to reduce the level of harm suffered in the society. Insurance, in contrast, deals with those losses that cannot realistically be
prevented. Private market insurance, financed by premiums collected
from insureds, places individuals into self-supporting risk pools in
ways that serve to reduce effective risks while amassing resources to
compensate those who ultimately suffer losses. Somewhat differently,
government insurance is provided for more generalized societal risks
for which no, or less of a, market exists, such as the risks of unemployment or disaster. Finally, government welfare redistributes wealth
from the general citizenry to persons whose unfortunate situation
does not derive from the wrongful acts of specific individuals and who
have not otherwise been in a position to protect themselves by savings
or insurance.
As I shall describe, the September 11th Fund, in its design and its
operation, comprises features resembling each of these four systems
for dealing with adverse consequences. But the Fund departs from
these four systems in two distinctive ways that I believe account now,
and will continue to account for, the criticism leveled against the Fund
and its operation and the dissatisfaction that many victim families feel
about it. Each of the four societal systems for dealing with adverse
consequences possesses an inner logic or rationale that defines and
constrains the magnitude of awards to compensate for loss. Quite differently, the September 11th Fund does not. As we shall see, the definition of awards draws variously from tort law and government
benefit programs. But its budget is basically unlimited. Further, the
September 11th Fund is administered chiefly according to the discretion of the Special Master. The Special Master has explained, generally, the principles that he has adopted for determining awards, but he
has (appropriately, given the context) declined to address individual
3. For a description of the legislative history of the Fund, see the excellent article by Lisa
Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92.
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awards. These two features of the Fund's operation, however, mean
that there does not exist-as there do for each of the four other systems-an effective rationale for delimiting the magnitude of compensation to any single family or to the families of the September 11th
victims in aggregate. In my judgment, this lack of internal constraint
will continue to generate criticism of the Fund long into the future.
Part II briefly describes the Fund's salient features and reviews
some of the many criticisms of it. Part III briefly reviews our interacting system of tort law, market insurance, government insurance, and
government welfare, as systems for dealing with unintended loss, explaining how the respective rationales of these systems serve to coherently define and constrain the magnitude of awards. Part IV then
shows how the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund is different and how it lacks any internal rationale of definition or constraint.

II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SEPTEMBER 11TH FUND

The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 aspires to
provide a particular form of compensation to the victims or to the
families of the victims of the September 11th attacks. 4 It provides recovery of a particular calculation of the economic and noneconomic
losses to the victim's dependents. This sum is then reduced by a: set of
collateral sources of compensation. These amounts are to be paid by
the federal government from general revenues without a budgetary
limit. The Fund itself is administered by a Special Master who has
been delegated the authority to define how these compensation elements will be calculated and, thus, "the amount of compensation to
which the claimant is entitled" taking into account "the harm to the
claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of
the claimant."' 5

4. The largest set of victims comprises those that died as a result of the attacks, whose families
are eligible for awards, and on whom this Article will focus. The Fund is also authorized to
provide recoveries to individuals who suffered injuries from the attacks but did not die. The
Special Master has announced qualification requirements for such awards, in particular, that the
claimant have sought medical care within a limited period of time (first, twenty-four hours, later
extended to seventy-two hours) following the attacks. Cf Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg.
66,274; Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233. This category of claimants raises somewhat different
difficulties.
5. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. Law 107-42, § 405
(b)(1)(B)(ii), 115 Stat. 238 (2001). For the announcement of the Special Master's calculation
methodology, see the Fund's Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274 and Final Rule, 67 Fed.
Reg. 11.233.
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Economic Losses

As defined by the Special Master, a claimant family's economic
losses are to be measured by determining each victim's expected lost
income from September 11, 2001, the date of death, through his or her
expected retirement adjusted in several ways. Given general discretion to determine the means of calculating this amount, the Special
Master has announced that he will rely upon the three years of the
victim's income just preceeding 2001 in order to project expected
earnings, at least "[g]enerally. '' 6 The Special Master has promulgated
a table indicating expected workforce participation by age of the victim. Expected taxes are to be deducted (income, thus, is to be defined
as after-tax income) and the value of employer benefits added. For
estimating future income, the Special Master has set a two percent
annual rate of inflation and a one percent annual rise in productivity,
uniform across all victims. This amount then will be adjusted for a
risk of unemployment and will be reduced by an estimate of household expenditure or consumption by the victim, generally inversely
proportional to income. The final amount will be reduced to present
value.
B.

Noneconomic Losses

The Special Master announced that noneconomic losses would be
set at a fixed amount for all victims: $250,000 per victim plus
$50,000-the Special Master later raised the amount to $100,000-for
7
a victim's surviving spouse and for each surviving child.
C.

CollateralSources

After the sum of a victim family's economic and noneconomic
losses is determined, the sum is to be reduced-as compelled by Congress-by certain collateral sources of compensation. Those collateral
sources are life insurance, pension funds, any death benefit programs,
and any payments by the government on account of death. Though
not required by statute-and, in my mind, basically inconsistent with
Congress's collateral source reduction-the Special Master has announced that he will not consider personal savings, investments, or
other assets, or receipts from private charity as collateral sources for
the purpose of the reduction. After many complaints, the Special
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXPLANATION OF PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED EcoLoss (Aug. 27, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vcmatrices.
pdf (last visited Oct. 14. 2003).
7. See Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,233.
NOMIC
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Master also announced that he would relax the collateral source reduction of life insurance and pension fund benefits by characterizing
some proportion of premium payments or contributions as savings
and, thus, not include them in the collateral source reduction.. The
Special Master is also authorized to consider any "individual circumstances". that might affect the collateral source reduction. 8 To this
end, the Special Master has announced that he is not likely to allow
the aggregate collateral source reduction to reduce any victim's award
below $250,000. 9 In addition, at the Clifford Symposium, Mr. Feinberg's principal assistant, Deborah Stevenson, described vividly adjustments made by the Special Master's Office to individual family
awards following extensive consultations with the families.
D. Administrative Features of the Fund
As mentioned, compensation awards from the Fund will be paid
from general federal revenues without any predetermined limit. 10 The
Fund is to be administered by a Special Master-currently Kenneth
Feinberg-who is given sole discretion to determine Fund awards. 1
The Special Master's award decisions are not appealable. Finally,
families of victims filing claims against the Fund must agree to waive
all civil liability*claims with respect to the victim's injury or death. 12
In practice, this provision was intended to shield suits against the airlines, airports, airport security companies, and various governmental
entities, such as the City of New York and its municipal departments,
the State of New York, the Port Authority, and all other parties who
might be named as defendants. Very recently, a New York federal
district court refused to dismiss victim family suits against American
and United Airlines, Boeing (the airplanes' manufacturer), the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (which owned the World
Trade Center), and other defendants. 13 Following this ruling, and just
as the New York and Virginia statutes of limitation for wrongful death
suits were expiring, scores of families filed suit against these
14
defendants.
8. Id. at 11,234.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 11,236.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 11,235.
13. Diana B. Henriques & Susan Saulney, Judge's Ruling Opens Door for More Families To
Sue Airlines and Port Authority, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at A16.
14. Kara Scannelli & Jess Brauin, Flurry of Lawsuits Mark Anniversary of Sept. II Attacks,

WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2003, at A3.
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The next section briefly describes our society's basic system of accident compensation through tort law, private market insurance, government insurance, and government-provided welfare, against which
the structure of the Fund will be compared.

III.

THE BASIC SYSTEMS FOR THE COMPENSATION OF

ACCIDENTAL LOSSES IN OUR SOCIETY

Our society possesses four basic mechanisms for dealing with the
consequences of unintended losses suffered by the citizenry. These
respective mechanisms operate differently, though each possesses a
distinctive internal logic that defines the contours of the mechanism.
As we shall see, though the September llth Fund borrows some features from each of the systems, it does so without an internal logic of
its own, which, in my view, is the source of the controversy that thet
Fund has generated.
A.

Tort Law

Our system of civil tort law addresses harms caused by an identifiable individual or entity who can be shown to have been able to prevent the loss. Although in traditional law it was necessary for a victim,
before obtaining a tort law recovery, to show that the injurer possessed a duty to avoid causing the harm, the duty requirement has
been diminished over the years by the implication of general duties to
avoid causing harm. In general, however, the victim must show that
the injurer could have prevented the harm in some way, but failed to
take the harm-avoiding action leading to the injury.
Upon showing a right to recover, tort law measures awards by full
compensation of both economic and noneconomic losses. Economic
losses are measured by expected lost income, generally adjusted for
taxes, expected productivity gains, and inflation. Noneconomic losses,
in the form of pain and suffering or loss of the value of life, are
awarded by a jury, which can set any amount, though with some constraint by subsequent judicial review. Collateral sources of compensa15
tion are generally not considered.
Although it has been traditional to stress the compensatory features
of the system, tort law is more adequately explained as a system for
creating deterrence of harm-causing activities. Ignoring collateral
compensation sources is a good example of the system's commitment
15. There has been an effort in some tort reform circles to abrogate the collateral source rule,
which provides that such compensation sources are to be disregarded. See George L. Priest, The
Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1588 (1987).
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to a deterrence rationale. If the concern of the system were only to
guarantee that the victim of some accidental loss was able to restore
some previous position, the availability of collateral sources would be
highly relevant. Instead, collateral sources are ignored because the
internal logic of the system of tort law recovery is one of charging the
tortfeasor the full costs of the victim's injury on the belief that internalizing injury costs will lead the tortfeasor, or parties in similar positions, to take actions to avoid causing injuries in the future. 16 The tort
law recovery, thus, becomes a form of price charged to the injurer as a
consequence of causing the harm.
The deterrence rationale explains why tort law devotes the energy it
does to calculating the full loss to the victim precisely. Where the ambition is to determine the appropriate price for harm-causing behavior, it is important to measure exactly the full economic and
noneconomic losses that have been suffered. Awarding full loss is a
means of setting the accurate price. Therefore, it is important to invest substantial resources to determine lost future income, inflated by
the best estimate of future productivity gains, reduced by expected
taxes (because the victim cannot lose amounts that would have had to
have been paid as taxes though the tax loss to the government should
not be neglected), reduced by expected inflation, all discounted to
present value.
Sometimes, the collateral source rule-which disregards collateral
sources-is explained as relating to a form of property right of the
victim: because the victim has paid for the benefits, he or she deserves
to retain them, at least as against the tortfeasor. But if the goal of the
system were to assure compensation, in the sense of making sure that
victims of accidental injury were able to restore themselves after the
accident, the availability of collateral compensation sources would be
highly relevant. The comparison of the victim's desert versus the obligation of the tortfeasor, however, reinforces the point about pricing.
The system does not allow the tortfeasor to gain the benefit of the
victim's collateral compensation sources because its logic is to charge
the tortfeasor the full costs of the accident.
Note that there is no expectation, with respect to tort law recoveries, that different individuals are somehow deserving of equivalent
awards, even if they suffer the same injury or even death, by definition
equal. The logic of the system is to determine the accurate price for
the harm. That price will differ as tortfeasors harm individuals with
16. This was a central point made many years ago by Richard A. Posner. See
(1972).

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

RICHARD

A.
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different levels of income; thus, high income individuals will recover
more than low income individuals for an injury that results in exactly
the same level of disability. Those individuals who purchase, or have
access to, more expensive medical care will recover those full medical
costs, more than the amount received by individuals who received inferior care. (Again, by the collateral source rule, medical expenses
are recovered by the victim from the tortfeasor even if they were
defrayed by insurance.) Furthermore, noneconomic loss awards may
differ vastly across individuals because the implications of pain and
suffering or interference with the enjoyment of life may differ substantially for different individuals. Individuals who lead and who were
expected to continue to lead rich lives-both emotionally or in terms
of amenities-receive comparatively higher awards because a
debilitating injury or death imposes greater costs for which the
tortfeasor must pay.
The common law of tort has faced complications with respect to
determining an accurate price in the context of death. The common
law itself-a conservative institution that did not generally encourage
lawsuits-provided no recovery for death. That rule, however, has
been supplanted in all U.S. jurisdictions by two forms of statutes: Survivor's acts provide for the award of losses suffered by a victim during
the period from accident to death. These amounts can involve medical expenses and lost income and can involve pain and suffering experienced by the victim for even short periods in anticipation of death.
Wrongful death statutes award benefits to the dependents of victims
based upon what the victim would have provided them if the death
had not occurred. These benefits include both pecuniary amounts,
based upon the victim's expected future earnings, and nonpecuniary
amounts, based upon the care and nurture that the victim would have
provided. In practice, determining these amounts is very similar to
the award of personal injury damages to nondecedents: expected future income will be calculated as precisely as possible, though there
are often deductions for the amount the decedent could have been
expected to spend on himself or herself. Because the damages measure is defined as benefits expected to be received from the decedent,
receipts from the decedent's future income are commonly capped at
the age of majority for surviving children. The calculation of nonpecuniary losses is similar: Evidence will be introduced concerning the
decedent's emotional ties to the dependents. These measures approach, though they do not exactly duplicate, an economic calculation
of the appropriate price to be charged a tortfeasor for inflicting death
upon a victim.
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B.

Insurance

As described, tort law provides awards in contexts in which a loss
could have been prevented. Insurance, in contrast, is a means of dealing with all other losses that occur in society: those that cannot be
prevented. As such, it is empirically a far more prominent form of
recovery for accidental loss.
1.

Private Market Insurance

7

The ambition of private market insurance is not exactly to provide
compensation for loss. Though insurance benefits are a form of compensation, the basic purpose of the institution of private insurance is
to equalize financial positions over various states of the world-as between states in which the insured has not suffered an injury and states
in which the injury has occurred. The insured pays premiums and
reduces his or her financial wherewithal during all states in order to
equalize financial wherewithal by recovering insurance benefits after
an injury or loss occurs.
Because it is a mechanism of financial intermediation, private insurance deals only with economic losses. There is no insurance demanded or available for noneconomic loss. A good illustration of the
absence of such demand is the empirical fact that no parent purchases
life insurance for a child. Surely a parent will expect to suffer severe
emotional loss if a child were to die. But insurance involves reducing
one's financial position (by paying premiums) in one period in order
to restore one's financial position at a subsequent period, after a loss
occurs. It makes no general sense for a parent to reduce the family's
financial position while the child is alive in order to enhance its financial position after the child dies; indeed, the reverse. Thus, there is no
economic reason to purchase life insurance on a child. 18
The economic function of insurance also explains why there is no
market for insurance that provides "full" compensation. All insurance markets provide benefits that are below-sometimes substantially below-the amount necessary for full compensation. Obvious
examples are the existence of deductibles and coinsurance provisions
in common property insurance policies-home or auto, for exampleor in medical policies. No one purchases what might be called full
insurance, both because the costs are too high to do so (for moral
hazard reasons), and because truly full insurance is inconsistent with
17. See Priest, supra note 15, at 1539-50.
18. Some families purchase small amounts of life insurance on children to ensure that they
will have sufficient financial resources to pay for an unexpected burial.
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the ambitions of the insurance institution. First, as is well known, limitations on coverage, such as deductibles and coinsurance, serve to discipline claims made against the insurance (the moral hazard), vastly
reducing total insurance costs and, conversely, increasing the availability of basic coverage. Thus, the structure of private insurance is
best seen as maximizing basic coverage by excluding or limiting the
coverage of unusual or extreme losses. Second, the concept of full
insurance is inconsistent with the idea of spreading financial risks over
time. Again, paying for insurance today reduces one's immediate financial ability to purchase other goods and services. The economic
calculation regarding magnitude of insurance is how much one should
sacrifice during uninjured periods in order to have greater resources if
an injury or death were to occur.
It is this calculus, for example, that leads individuals to purchase life
insurance for dependents only equal to some multiple of current income, not equal to full lost income until expected retirement. For
many years, a common benchmark for determining the appropriate
level of life insurance has been five or six times annual income, upon
the expectation that, if the breadwinner were to die, the spouse and
dependents would have sufficient resources to support themselves for
several years at equivalent levels until they adjust their lives. Greater
amounts might be purchased to deal with expected future college expenses. Conversely, often life insurance is allowed to lapse or loans
are taken against the insurance as children leave dependency.
Collateral financial resources are relevant to insurance, at least over
some range. Obviously, the extremely wealthy need less insurance
than the rest of us, though there may well remain advantages to equalizing wealth over time even to the rich. In this respect, private savings
are a potential alternative to insurance. Yet where the source of the
potential future setback is probabilistic-a true risk-insurance is far
less costly than savings because insurers can pool risks together, vastly
reducing the level of reserves necessary to provide equivalent levels of
protection. There are some forms of future loss, however, that are not
insurable because they are largely in the control of the individual,
such as a setback in one's career. 19 People must accumulate savings
for forms of loss of this nature.
Note that there is no expectation of equality across citizens with
respect to insurance. Individuals purchase insurance coverage based
upon their financial needs and abilities to equalize resources over
19. See George L. Priest, Government Insurance Versus Market Insurance,28
& INS. 71 (2003) (addressing issue of insurability).

ON RISK
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time. Those with greater assets and income are likely to purchase
greater amounts of insurance over some range, but it is worthwhile for
the poor to insure-in some senses, more worthwhile. This point explains why it is a societal imperative to maintain a legal regime that
maximizes the availability of basic insurance coverage.
The discipline of the system of private first-party insurance, however, results from the fact that it is entirely self-supporting: Insureds
only receive insurance benefits for which they have paid in advance.
These payments, of course, are a means of protecting for the occurrence of a risk which may not occur or, as in life insurance, may not
occur at an early time. As a consequence, careful economic calculations are necessary with respect to how much to reduce financial resources in order to obtain insurance protection.
2.

Government-ProvidedInsurance

Government-provided insurance is substantially different in structure and operation from private market insurance. 20 Government insurance is typically provided in contexts where no market insurance is
available. In contrast to private market insurance, government-provided insurance is generally not self-supporting; if the provision of insurance could be self-supporting, the market would provide it, though
there are contexts in which the existence of government insurance
"crowds out" any market offering. 2 1 There are some contexts in
which government insurance appears designed to be self-supporting.
Typically, however-and often because of the structure of the insurance provided-the true economic cast of the program is revealed
only when some crisis occurs. Federal deposit insurance and the savings and loan debacle is a good example. 2 2 Because government insurance programs require subsidization, however, all government
supported regimes are subject to budget constraints.
A further important difference between market insurance and government-provided insurance derives from the fact that the benefits are
provided by a political entity-the government-which is subject to
different constraints on how it deals with the citizenry. First, government insurance programs are characterized by an ethic of universal
availability, offered to all citizens who desire coverage, not carefully
selected risks, as in private insurance. Second, provision by the gov20. See id.
21. Medical insurance for the elderly is a good example. Basic medical insurance for the elderly was entirely crowded out by the enactment of Medicare.
22. Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, Deposit Insurance Reform: A Functional Approach, 38
CARNEGIE-CONF. SERIES PUBLIC POL'Y 1 (1993).
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ernment also implies an ethic of nondiscrimination among beneficiaries, both in terms of premiums charged and benefits provided.
There is an ethic of equality in coverage or, at the minimum, restrictions on the extent of discrimination among beneficiaries, both with
respect to premiums and insurance benefits. Private market insurance
discriminates sharply among insureds in terms of risks: Premiums are
set according to risk levels; thus, high risk individuals may pay premiums multiples higher than the premiums charged the low risk. In contrast, because of the nondiscrimination ethic of government programs
generally, there is far less discrimination among insureds in government-provided insurance programs. A necessary implication of these
facts is that government-provided insurance is generally extended
more broadly, but with much lower benefit levels, than is characteristic of private market insurance.
Some commentators describe government-provided insurance as incorporating a principle of full restitution of a victim's losses, 2 3 but this
is political rhetoric rather than reality. Crime victim insurance provides very low levels of recovery. Even more established governmentinsurance programs, such as unemployment insurance, incorporate
multiple limitations-waiting periods, limited periods of coverageand provide benefit levels at a fraction of workers' incomes. Other
government-provided insurance programs are hardly insurance at
all-Medicare is a good example. Other programs have some insurance dimension-disaster insurance is an example-but are better understood as benefit programs, rather than insurance.
C. Government Welfare
The final and ultimate mechanism for dealing with losses in our society is public welfare. Welfare is provided by the government to
those individuals who have suffered losses- -or who are in economic
positions that resemble the suffering of a loss-but who have no claim
in tort law against another person on account of their position, and
who have not adequately protected themselves through savings or private insurance. The internal logic of our public welfare systems is not
compensation, it is basic need. Welfare provides a form of economic
support based upon the need of the individual. The level of support
provided, however, is constrained by that need and constrained by the
source of the support. Welfare is a form of redistribution from citizens engaged in productive activities to individuals who, if only mo23. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251 (2003).

2003]

PROBLEMATIC. STRUCTURE

539

mentarily, are nonproductive. (If they were productive, they would
not need the welfare.) Thus, there is a constraint to provide only that
level of support sufficient to provide minimal aid to an individual, that
will hopefully enable the individual to resume workforce participation
in order to become productive and self-supporting.
Based upon a logic of basic need, collateral sources of compensation-such as savings or assets-are centrally relevant to the institution. If a person possesses or has available collateral financial
resources, welfare support will be denied because the requisite need is
absent.
Because the ambition of the institution is to provide some minimal
level of resources to support basic needs, .there is a greater ethic of
equality with respect to welfare than with respect to tort law or private insurance. The equality norm may stem, in part, from the fact
that the support is provided by the government, broadly constrained
to treat citizens equally, similar to the constraint motivating the structure of government insurance. But another part of the equality ethic
derives from the notion that only basic needs are to be supported,
needs that are not likely to differ greatly among individuals. Some
differences are tolerated where they can be justified, such as greater
food stamps to larger families or some special needs of the elderly.
But, in general, the support available from government-provided welfare does not differ substantially across recipients.
IV.

THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION
FUND COMPARED

The various elements of awards under the September 11th Fund
resemble, but do not exactly match, elements of the four basic societal
mechanisms for injury compensation. This section discusses the differences and explains what I believe to be the failings of the September 11th Fund. As mentioned, the Special Master has defined
principles for the award of economic losses, noneconomic losses, and
the adjustment for collateral sources. The principles defined possess a
certain plausibility, but lack a defining logic and constraint.
A.

Economic Losses

The definition of awards of economic loss under the Fund most
closely resembles the measurement of wrongful death awards under
tort law. 24 The Fund's awards, however, are in some respects more
generous than tort law awards and, therefore, in excess of actual loss
24. See infra Part IV C.
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to dependants and, in other respects, less generous, and therefore,
more characteristic of governmental aid programs. For example,
under the Fund, economic losses are measured equal to lost income
projected until retirement, less expected taxes and less an estimate of
the decedent's personal consumption. For younger families, this measure is more generous than tort law awards, which cap the expected
receipts of surviving children at the year of their majority, not at the
year of the bread winner's retirement. Measurement under the Fund
is different, however, and less generous than tort law, by its adoption
of a standard one percent per year productivity increase, uniform for
all victims. A uniform benefit measure of this kind, and a uniform
measure at a low level, is common to government programs-government insurance and surely for government welfare-but it leads to
differentially lower awards for the families of victims who died at
early points in their careers relative to older victims for whom an annual one percent increase in productivity might be more realistic.
The definition of economic losses adopted by the Special Master,
therefore, lacks an underlying rationale. Some parts resemble tort
law, but are inexplicitly more generous 25-the rate of expected increase of future income. The Special Master's adoption of a standardized schedule for reductions on account of the decedent's
consumption is similar. The Master has not explained the basis for the
schedule. Other parts, such as the assumption of a one percent productivity increase, are dramatically less generous than tort law awards,
especially for younger families of well-educated victims. The one percent assumption may have been adopted on equality grounds-resembling government insurance or welfare-or, perhaps, on
administrative grounds because of the difficulty of estimating future
income increases person-by-person. 26 Given the other forms of personalization of awards under the Fund, however, the administrative
burden concerns cannot be taken seriously. As a consequence, there
is no coherent justification for the Fund's definition of economic loss.
B.

Noneconomic Losses

As described, the Special Master has set the noneconomic loss measure as equal for each victim family-$250,000 per victim plus
$100,000 for a surviving spouse and for each surviving child. The Special Master's decision regarding noneconomic losses has proven extremely controversial, especially among young families with children
25. But see infra note 30.
26. See also, Part IV. C.
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who have claimed that the noneconomic loss awards should be much
27
higher.
There is a good explanation for why this element of the September
11th award is controversial: It is not consistent with any of our current societal conceptions of compensation. First, among the four compensation mechanisms described here, only tort law awards any
amount whatsoever for noneconomic losses. Compensation for
noneconomic loss is not available under government insurance nor,
surely, under government welfare, and is not obtained under market
insurance because it is not purchased in any form. The award of
noneconomic losses under tort law can be easily defended as an important additional element of deterrence: Our society wishes to deter
the infliction of noneconomic losses just as much as of economic
losses. The September 11th Fund, however, has no deterrent purpose. 28 Here again, therefore, the amounts awarded for noneconomic
loss possess no coherent rationale. They are less than tort law awards
and do not pretend to measure individualized loss, but are vastly
greater than any form of insurance benefit-generally zero in both
private and government insurance contexts. The awards are defined
as equal to equally-sized families, but the magnitude of the equal
29
amount possesses no justification.
Furthermore, under tort law, awards for noneconomic losses are individualized. In wrongful death cases, large families, young families,
families that are emotionally close and in which the decedent was a
caring and devoted parent, will receive larger awards for noneconomic
loss than families that do not share these characteristics. Under the
September 11th Fund, in contrast, these differences are minimally
taken into account by the $100,000 per spouse and child additions.
The uniformity of the fixed sum of $250,000 per victim and $100,000
per spouse and child is characteristic (though surely not at such a high
level) of government insurance and welfare programs, which commonly offer equalized benefits, but the conception of equalized
27. Earlier complaints of this nature led the Special Master to increase the spouse and per
child award from an initially announced $50,000 to $100,000. 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13,
2002).
28. This point is slightly complicated. Though surely not serving as a direct deterrent, one
Congressional aim in establishing the Fund was to deflect private tort actions that might be filed
against a failing airline industry or against the federal and state governmental agencies implicated in the attacks. Toward that end, awards under the Fund had to resemble tort awards to
some degree. Given that a court has recently held that victim family lawsuits may proceed
against various defendants, there may be additional pressures to amend Fund awards to more
closely resemble tort law awards.
29. See infra Part IV. C.
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noneconomic loss awards is totally alien because these government
programs never provide compensation for noneconomic losses.
C.

Collateral Source Reductions

As mentioned, awards under the September 11th Fund are to be
reduced by the availability of collateral benefit receipts by order of
Congress. 30 In his discretion, the Special Master decided to define this
reduction as applying only to life insurance, pension fund, and death
benefit funds, and not to savings, investments, and assets. Later, after
substantial complaint from victim families, the Special Master announced that he would characterize other portions of the collateral
31
sources as savings, diminishing the expected reduction.
Though the awards under the Fund for economic losses and, to a
lesser extent, noneconomic losses bear some resemblance to tort law
awards, there is no reduction for collateral benefit sources under tort
law. Collateral benefits, such as life insurance, are relevant under private market insurance: Their existence reduces demand for additional
private insurance because there is no economic purpose in insuring
twice for the same loss. Moreover, there is a public policy and insurer
interest in preventing excessive coverage. Collateral insurance benefits and the possession of assets is relevant to the provision of both
government insurance and government welfare. If alternative insurance sources are available, typically no government insurance will be
provided. Somewhat differently, though similar to a government program, if an individual possesses insurance or assets, no government
welfare will be available in any form. The limited reductions under
the September 11th Fund for collateral benefits, therefore, is a total
oddity. Because the only reason for ignoring collateral sources is deterrence, there is no rationale whatsoever for the various distinctions
32
now effected under the Fund.
As can be seen, the various elements of awards under the September l1th Fund do not fit easily into any of our current societal systems
for providing compensation for loss. September 11th Fund awards are
less than awards under tort law, appropriately because there is no deterrent ambition of the Fund, but inexplicably, because many of the
30. 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,239.
31. The Special Master also determined that private charitable donations would be disregarded for purposes of the collateral source reduction. Id. at 11,234. This is a highly significant
decision because each victim family has received seven figure sums from private charities and
some families-especially those of fallen firefighters-have received even greater amounts. See
Robert A. Katz, Too Much of a Good Thing: When Charitable Gifts Augment Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 547 (2003).
32. But see supra note 28.
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Fund award elements only resemble awards under tort law and are
entirely different from awards under any other compensation system.
Various elements of Fund awards resemble government benefit programs, chiefly by the uniformity or equality of benefit measures or
amounts, but government programs never provide the levels of benefits-as tort law, in contrast, does-that are awarded under the Fund.
These various differences surely have generated grounds that victim
families or others could fail to understand and, thus, cause complaints
about the design of the Fund.
There are two deeper differences, however, between the principles
for determining awards under the Fund and the four societal mechanisms for providing compensation for loss that I believe have generated, and will continue in the future to generate, controversy
concerning the Fund. First, awards under the Fund have no defining
or constraining logic; second, the definition of awards has been placed
entirely in the hands of a Special Master. Both of these features of
Fund administration are alien to our society's understanding of
compensation.
First, each of the four systems of compensation-unlike the Fundcontains an internal logic that both defines and constrains the nature
of awards. As explained, tort law seeks to set a price on causing harm
by charging a tortfeasor the exact amount of the harm caused. This
serves to define tort damages-they are to be measured exactly
equally to harm caused-and it also serves to constrain those awards.
By this logic, tort law awards should neither be too high nor too low;
there is an exact figure appropriate for the award.
Private market insurance defines benefits according to what a policyholder has paid for, measured in terms of the policyholder's desire
for coverage in relation to expected loss. Again, there is a private
interest and public policy in not providing excessive insurance. But
there is also a private interest in obtaining only basic insurance coverage, and not coverage of losses that can otherwise be controlled, because of the price restraint that results from the fact that policyholders
pay premiums based upon coverage desired.
Government insurance and welfare programs are different yet.
Typically, because offered by the government, there is an ethic of
equality in coverage and benefits with a minimum of discrimination,
among either policyholders in the case of government insurance, or
among welfare beneficiaries. In addition, government insurance and
welfare benefits are provided at much lower levels than available private market insurance or tort law. These lower benefit levels are understood as necessary because all government programs are
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constrained by budgetary concerns. Given limited government resources, increasing benefits for one government program suggests the
need to limit benefits to another. The general budget constraint of
government limits the extent to which any single beneficiary or set of
beneficiaries can demand greater benefits.
In contrast, for the September 11th Fund, there is no equivalent
rationale and no equivalent ethic of restraint. As explained, there is
no clear coherence in the definition of award elements under the
Fund. Some elements resemble awards under tort law, more or less;
some are entirely foreign to tort law awards.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, there is no principle that
defines a constraint on awards under the September 11th Fund.
Awards under tort law are constrained by the principle of awarding
exactly the right amount. Recoveries under private market insurance
are constrained by the principle that a beneficiary receives only what
he or she has paid for. Benefits under government insurance or government welfare programs are constrained by general governmental
budgetary limits. In contrast, there is no constraint on awards under
the September 11th Fund. Its budget is unlimited, and its definitional
principles vague. It is, therefore, not surprising that many victim families have argued for larger awards.
Finally, there is a second difference between awards under our society's four compensation systems and awards under the Fund that is
worthy of notice. Our society's four compensation mechanisms arein some form-democratically defined. The common law derives
from time immemorial; adjustments to it-say, by the enactment of
survivor's and wrongful death statutes-have been made by democratically elected legislatures. Private market insurance is not democratic in a political sense, but it derives from citizen choices and bears
the legitimacy of any allocation of resources determined under conditions of competition. Obviously, government insurance and welfare
are defined by democratically elected bodies.
In contrast, the definition of awards under the September 11th
Fund has been delegated nearly entirely to a single person, the Special
Master. This is not to derogate the decisions that the current Special
Master, Kenneth Feinberg, has made. All agree, and I surely do with
emphasis, that he has performed his duties with the greatest judgment
and dedication. There is a sense, however, in which the awards
granted under the September l1th Fund serve as a surrogate for a
measure of the value of the lives of the victims who perished on September 11th. My colleague, Judge Guido Calabresi, in an important
book published many years ago, described the necessity of selecting
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particular types of bodies to make difficult-in his word, tragic-decisions, such as of the value of life. 33 The September 11th Fund will
remain controversial because the source of the definition of its
awards-however able and committed-is not in any sense democratic. Coupled with the lack of an internal rational or constraint, the
awards granted by the Fund will continue to remain problematic.

33. GuIDo CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBrrT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (defending juries of randomly chosen laypersons sitting discontinuously and deciding aresponsibly-without explanation-as appropriate for tragic decisions).
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